oversight resources. 13 It should surprise no one that states often are reluctant to pay much attention to a problem they think they have "solved," even if it is demonstrated that is not completely true.
14 Environmental justice advocates and others have demonstrated the need to involve the public in planning for the future at brownfields sites, 15 and while public input is increasingly part of brownfields remediation and reuse, it is not always meaningful. 16 Another trend of the past two decades is the emergence of a broader land use planning agenda centered on sustainability, and its intersection with brownfields laws and policies. 17 As one report observes, "Communities will succeed in brownfields revitalization when they consider these properties as community and economic opportunities that happen to have an environmental challenge, and connect brownfields initiatives to their broader community vision and revitalization priorities." 18 This responds in part to the challenge of climate change, which was less well known at the time most VCPs began. To many, brownfields now "take center stage in a sustainable planning strategy of thwarting sprawl, preserving open space, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and reinvesting in urban areas and their communities."
19
The intersection of brownfields redevelopment and these broader concerns presents a host of issues. Does redevelopment of brownfields connect to a larger vision for the city that links with "smart growth" and climate action goals? Retooling the original developer-centered vision of VCPs to promote broader goals is an ongoing challenge. Has the affected community been involved in planning for brownfields remediation, or has the developer controlled the process? The latter narrows the ability to view 13 the project as part of a community-wide plan, and undermines its legitimacy. Finally, if brownfields redevelopment yields benefits, how can we measure success over the long term? Metrics for assessing this are only just now emerging.
As I note in Part III, many key questions have incomplete answers today, and as a result, finality in brownfields remediation and reuse continues to elude us. I draw a number of examples from New Jersey, a Rust Belt state with many brownfields and a complex history of dealing with them. 20 Recent developments in that state, including a 2009 state statute that privatized cleanups, 21 and well-publicized funding shortfalls and regulatory errors in 2011, 22 highlight the challenges of contemporary brownfields redevelopment.
I. THE BROWNFIELDS "PROBLEM"
"Brownfields" are abandoned or underused sites that the SBLRBRA defines as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant."
23
The United States has perhaps 400,000 to as many as one million brownfields, 24 although reliable information is hard to come by. 25 These sites are found throughout the nation, but urban brownfields such as abandoned steel mills or other manufacturing facilities, and formerly grand railroad stations now idle, 26 former owners are gone, and cities or other public entities now own them. 29 They have often had numerous owners and histories of industrial or commercial use, but have not been touched for years. 30 Without environmental investigations, it is often difficult to discern the extent of contamination or need for remediation, let alone whether sites would be dangerous enough to qualify for the National Priorities List ("NPL"). 31 Brownfields sites may have advantages over other locations. They often sit near railroads, highways, other forms of transportation, and the bulk of cities' populations.
32
Yet developers often have the choice of foregoing them altogether for greenfield sites in suburbs and exurbs. 33 The cost of redeveloping a brownfield can be higher than that of a greenfield site.
34 This is not universally the case, however. If the greenfield site has been previously developed and requires rehabilitation of its own, that might negate the cost advantage, 35 and if the infrastructure at the brownfield site is usable, that might help narrow the cost disadvantage. 36 Brownfields redevelopment has numerous potential benefits. 37 As the EPA puts it, "Revitalizing brownfield sites creates benefits at the site and Other potential benefits include reductions in storm water runoff and air pollution, 43 and increased property values in neighboring areas. 44 At five revitalized sites, the EPA found a 32 to 57 percent reduction in vehicle miles traveled, a 47 to 62 percent reduction in storm water runoff, and a 2-3 percent increase in adjacent property values.
45
In the mid-to late-1980s, some began to argue that a major challenge to brownfields redevelopment (and perhaps the most prominent one) was the stigma from the possible presence of environmental contamination. 46 A 1992 Congressional field hearing in Ohio saw the first use of the term "brownfield," 47 in contrast to pristine "greenfield" sites. Many claimed reform to CERCLA and other laws was indispensable to removing the "brown" stigma. 48 This fear of liability was overstated, as it turned out that the vast majority of brownfields sites were not contaminated enough to 38 wind up on the NPL. 49 It also gave CERCLA greater prominence than it deserved among other barriers to urban redevelopment, such as changes in consumer preferences or residential patterns. 50 Still, there was something to the fear of liability. Throughout the 1980s, courts gave the EPA more power under CERCLA to investigate and remediate sites, and to the EPA and private parties to fasten liability on PRPs.
51
CERCLA's broad liability provisions capture a wide group of entities, whether or not they did any actual waste dumping. Attempting to evaluate brownfield sites might subject developers to liability because owners and "operators" are jointly and severally liable under CERCLA, whether or not they owned the sites at the time of disposal.
52 Therefore, assuming serious contamination was discovered, a developer might face the full price tag of CERCLA remediation even if it did nothing to cause the contamination there.
53
Developers balked at becoming involved with brownfields, fearing the worst. 54 Remediation costs could not be quantified ahead of time, 55 and even after investigations, knowing cleanups' price tags would be difficult. CERCLA cleanups cannot be priced in advance, because remediation is a lengthy process that includes (among other requirements) compliance with ARARs-requirements of other environmental laws. about how to remediate them, might' expose a developer to liability, it was easier to shun the site.
Amendments to CERCLA and EPA policies aimed to lessen developers' burden, but were largely unsuccessful. The 1986 SARA amendments 57 added an "innocent landowner" defense designed to protect those, like brownfields developers, who purchased sites after waste dumping took place, and were therefore not responsible for contaminating them. 58 However, this defense was not widely used, because meeting its requirements was difficult. 59 Those seeking to prove their innocence had to demonstrate that they had engaged in "all appropriate inquiry" before purchasing a site. 60 Most courts retained liability for prospective purchasers who had not discovered the contamination before purchasing the sites, reasoning they probably had not done enough investigation. 61 Thus, rather than protect brownfields developers, the innocent landowner defense's shortcomings led many to claim more CERCLA reform was needed. 62 Brownfields advocates sought partnerships with environmental agencies rather than adversarial enforcement-based relationships, shorter cleanup processes with more certainty (including releases or other forms of indicating that the brownfields purchaser would not face liability), and lesser cleanup standards that in some cases would allow less costly means of addressing contamination at the site (for example, so-called "institutional controls" such as fences and warning signs). 63 States hit hardest by the recession of the early 1990s tended to be the ones with the most brownfields. 64 Difficult economic conditions added to the increasingly widespread concern that CERCLA (and its state analogues 57 
Streamlined administrative processes:
In VCPs, the steps between identification of a site as one to which the program will apply, and final remediation and reuse, are far less in number and shorter in duration than in enforcement-driven models. 76 Often, developers are put in control of many steps of the process (in some states, by hiring licensed environmental professionals to administer the entire cleanup).
77
Risk-based cleanup standards: In VCPs, the end use to which sites will be put (such as commercial, industrial, or residential) is factored into the risk assessment of the sites, leading to standards that typically require less than complete remediation. 78 Often, developers can cut costs by adopting remedies such as entombing soils at brownfield sites rather than removing and treating them.
79
Liability protection: States offer a number of means for developers to secure protection against future enforcement actions by their environmental agencies, ranging from "no further action" letters (statements of intent that developers would not face liability in the future) to full releases from liability.
80
In states such as New Jersey, licensed environmental professionals often decide cleanup levels within defined parameters. 81 the Department of Environmental Protection. 83 This process takes these critical decisions out of the hands of state environmental authorities, and relies on quality control of the professionals to ensure proper results.
84 This "outsourcing" may provide brownfields developers with the state liability protection they seek, but provides no government's guarantee that they have undertaken proper remediation activities. 85 Federal liability, of course, is another matter altogether. Before 2002, developers could obtain protection against state liability by completing remediation activities in VCPs, but there was no exemption from CERCLA liability. 86 Even though states could not protect developers against federal liability, their releases were typically viewed as sufficient comfort to proceed with redevelopment activities. 87 There was some federal activity on the liability front. States negotiated with the EPA to create memoranda of understanding that gave some protection to sites addressed in their VCPs without a full release from liability. 88 The CERCLA innocent landowner defense and some federal programs, such as the EPA's guidance on "prospective purchaser agreements," provided limited protections. 89 After the SBLRBRA's enactment in 2002, the prospect of CERCLA liability receded. The SBLRBRA provided a prospective purchaser exemption from CERCLA, which the EPA subsequently issued regulations to clarify. 90 The EPA regulations require the prospective purchaser to allow access to and cooperate with regulators, 91 and exercise care in dealing with the prior releases of contaminants at the site so as not to exacerbate the problem.
92
The new law also restricted actions under CERCLA against developers who remediate sites in VCPs. 
Ill. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO "FINALITY"
The SBLRBRA provided liability protection, but did not bring finality to the brownfields problem. One challenge is simply that many sites have not been addressed. While large urban brownfields have been reused, other sites sit neglected. According to one recent estimate, states have only successfully dealt with 1 % to 2% of all brownfields sites.
94
A VCP traditionally deals with each site on its own, and remediation and reuse plans often have no requirement to relate to any comprehensive plan for urban redevelopment. 95 There are exceptions to this, as some American cities eschew parcel-by-parcel redevelopment in favor of more systematic redevelopment approaches. 96 However, finality demands a broader approach than is currently employed at many sites.
A. Relationship to Smart Growth and Climate Action
A brownfields project should fit within an overall plan of development for the affected community, with the community viewing the economic, environmental and institutional elements in a framework that considers all impacts and not just those of remediation. 97 One problem, as noted above, is the parcel-specific nature of brownfields redevelopment. 98 New York and New Jersey have area-wide brownfields initiatives, in which regulators attempt to address multiple brownfields in the same community. 99 It has been noted that, "[i]n contrast to site-specific remediation, the area-wide approach of the [ larger physical, political and social contexts of an affected community." 100 The EPA has called for more "area-wide planning among areas and corridors of brownfield sites," 101 selecting twenty-three communities for grants to develop area-wide plans.
102
In one encouraging development, there are active links between the "smart growth" movement and brownfields redevelopment. 103 "Smart growth" refers to the myriad of "creative strategies to develop in ways that preserve natural lands and critical environmental areas, protect water and air quality, and reuse already-developed land," which stand in opposition to the existing patterns of "sprawl" -centered development. 104 However, the fact that brownfields projects use existing urban land and, at times, some existing infrastructure, does not necessarily make that growth "smart."
105
There are many opportunities for smart reuse of brownfield sites that would not only conserve greenfields acreage but also deploy green technologies to reduce carbon emissions and produce other benefits. 106 Some sites have been transformed into urban greenways. 107 An intriguing new use of brownfields sites is for renewable energy facilities, 108 including so-called "brightfields" 109 locating solar panel arrays and wind turbines at urban sites.
110
Using green design and construction techniques in overhauling existing buildings at a brownfields site may conserve energy and feature sustainable building materials and creative waste reduction strategies.
111
The LEED certification system for sustainable buildings awards points for building on a brownfields site, and adds points for variables like building close to existing transportation systems. 112 An evolving long-term trend involves planning activities that explicitly connect brownfields with actions to address climate change.
113
Local sustainability or environmental quality departments are integrating brownfields redevelopment with community-wide land use planning efforts.
114 Climate action plans (such as those developed in Portland and Cincinnati, which discuss the role of brownfields redevelopment 115 ) can be excellent tools for integrating brownfields redevelopment planning in a city's climate change response.
Although there has been much progress in this area at brownfields sites, "there is still room and need for further experimentation and implementation of sustainable and green methodologies."
116
That could serve as a summary of the relationship between greentech and brownfields redevelopment at present: much has been accomplished, but there are still considerable opportunities. Some form of evaluative approach will also be necessary to determine whether brownfields policies meet the criteria outlined in climate action plans.
B. Community Participation
Brownfields remediation and reuse often "dramatically impact[s] the health and economy of the nearby communities,"
118 and community planners have therefore viewed participation of the affected community as critical to a brownfields project's success. 119 As one report observes, "Community involvement and consensus is one of the most important ingredients for a successful brownfield project." 120 Different actors may have diverging ideas about the ideal plan for transforming an urban brownfield site, 121 and public involvement in the process can bring a wider focus on community redevelopment than that of a developer. 122 Discussing a number of successful projects since the 1990s, the EPA has observed that, "By creating a dialogue among all stakeholders in a brownfields project, community engagement enhances the final reuse of the property and the long-term success of the project." 123 Public participation in brownfields redevelopment also recognizes the central concern of environmental justice advocates 124 that sites are often in areas of cities where residents have "traditionally been left out of the planning process," 125 and community outreach can address the political marginalization of these residents.
Yet to many developers, economic concerns are paramount. 126 For this reason, the initial design of many VCPs empowered developers to fix the extent of public input in decision-making at brownfields sites. 127 This is a sharp distinction between this process and the CERCLA model, where extensive public participation in cleanup activities is mandatory.
128
Although VCPs do not typically require public participation, developers are increasingly working with affected communities to garner support for individual projects. 129 Unfortunately, even when developers conduct public meetings or other means of involvement, the level of participation can fall far short of meaningful input. 130 In many cities, there are no obvious stakeholders to voice concerns of residents near brownfields sites, let alone engage in discussions with developers that have already committed to moving projects forward.
131 Designating or forming a citizen "steering committee" or other community-based group can lead to enhanced public participation and a wider focus on community redevelopment, particularly if that organization is an existing group that has knowledge and expertise in the affected community. 132 Regardless of the means chosen to provide for public input, the challenge remains at many sites and in many cities to allow affected communities to have a meaningful say in the future of brownfields projects.
C. Evaluation of Site and Program Results
In 2011, news reports pointed to numerous shortcomings in the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) assessments of the 1,600 sites awarded grants under the state's fund for brownfields remediation. 134 Officials did now know, for example, whether the sites had ever been developed for the specific purposes identified in the grants.
135
The DEP's Commissioner subsequently criticized these reports, calling the program a "national model" and stating that, "the DEP and EDA closely track exactly how much HDRSF money is being spent on each brownfields project through a rigorous process that includes thorough technical and financial reviews. states: while a large number of projects have been processed through state VCPs, there is little adequate analysis of the results. 137 The VCP process focuses on the present day problem of transforming an abandoned or underused site into a locus for commerce, and, as a result, has not focused on impacts of site redevelopment after initial remediation and reuse activities. m
To date there has not been much "systematic, careful documentation of actual practice at a wide range of [brownfield] sites," 139 and states do not have formal processes in place to evaluate sites over time. 140 Years after VCPs have been operating, research is finally underway to assess long-term impacts, 141 but adequate methodologies are not in place. In particular, it has been noted that, "methods and estimates for quantifying life cycle impacts, especially climate change mitigation associated with Brownfield development, do not currently exist." 142 States should do more to address this shortcoming of understanding the impacts of brownfields redevelopment in affected communities.
D. Public Investment in Brownfie/ds Sites: Critical But Often Lagging
In a high-profile "miss," the New Jersey DEP announced in summer 2011 that the fund it administers to provide funding for assessment and remediation of brownfields sites had run out of money.
143 Projects in the pipeline totaling $71 million were suspended, leaving their future in doubt.
144
This highlights a major challenge of current brownfields policy. Public support (including funding for site assessment and other purposes) is often critical for the success of brownfields redevelopment. 145 Initiatives at all levels of government target remediation and social, economic, institutional, and other aspects of brownfields reuse. 146 Public involvement begins at the very start of the process. In many communities, interest in brownfields is low, and this is especially true for small brownfields or those in cities with "little interest from developers and a lack of knowledge on how to proceed with redevelopment." 147 Localities and prospective developers interested in brownfields reuse often must also address capacity and management issues. 148 Developers can find the brownfields redevelopment process overly complex. 149 Matching developers with opportunities to remediate and reuse brownfields requires careful planning, for example, by employing marketing approaches and designating local officials as contact points to navigate complex approval processes.
150
Public funding can be an important factor in a project's success. Developers can obtain resources for a site's evaluation, remediation and reuse from a wide variety of federal and state agencies. 151 As Table 1 indicates, state grant, loan, training and education programs, and tax and other financing incentives support brownfields redevelopment. 152 At the federal level, the EPA implemented the SBLRBRA with federal grants and other tools to address brownfields sites. 153 These resources include grant programs for characterization of brownfields sites, and site analytical tools that can help make the process of environmental investigation and remediation less onerous and costly. 154 The EPA's Brownfields Assessment Grants are available to "inventory, characterize, assess, and conduct planning and community involvement related to brownfields sites." 155 Once a site has been selected for analysis, the use of comprehensive site analytical tools such as the EPA's Triad approach can streamline environmental investigation and cut remediation costs. 156 The EPA's brownfields website cites a number of redevelopment "Success Stories" linked to its brownfields programs. 157 Other federal agencies support site redevelopment activities, 158 and agencies are teaming together to address brownfields, with the HUD-DOT-EPA Interagency Partnership for Sustainable Communities (formed in 2009) serving as a notable example. 159 Federal programs on infrastructure and housing and community development are adapting to promote site redevelopment and reuse. 160 A particular focus is the link between brownfields redevelopment and economic growth. 161 Brownfields Job Training Grants, part of the $100 million that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act made available to the EPA, 162 are an example of this trend. Brownfields redevelopment is a source of "green jobs," linking greentech such as renewable energy sources and green building construction with job creation. The availability of public funding can be critical to brownfields redevelopment, and project success often "depends on the extent that public investments leverage private funds." 166 Public funding is especially important when site assessment and remediation costs exceed current property values, 167 which front-loads the developer's investment. 168 As the New Jersey program's shortfall illustrates, continued public investment is not always guaranteed in the current tight budgetary climate. 169 This is a serious threat to future brownfields remediation and reuse projects.
163
Brownfields remediation activities do not eliminate all risks, in part due to relaxed cleanup standards. As the brownfields history grows longer, there may be problematic sites if states do not have aggressive provisions for revisiting cleanups. 170 The efficacy of some brownfields cleanups has come under fire years afterwards as contamination has been discovered.
171
In one notorious example in New Jersey, the "Kiddie Kollege" day care center built on a former brownfield turned out to be situated on contaminated land.
172
States typically protect against backsliding with reopeners in VCPs that allow state environmental departments to require additional cleanup activities at a later date if changed conditions warrant it. 173 These reopeners have several drawbacks. In a system such as New Jersey's post-2009 Site Remediation Program, the state has no involvement with the site in its initial cleanup, 174 so it is unlikely to be vigilant in discovering postremediation flaws. Also, reopeners in VCPs tend to be limited to intervening to prevent imminent harm, as any broader provision is typically perceived as a deterrent to the initial entry into a VCP (although one empirical study has found that few sites are reopened and the fear is largely unwarranted 175 ).
One study suggests that "reopener rates may increase with more vigorous enforcement and over the passage of time," 176 but it seems more likely that fewer sites will be addressed in the future. Any reopener provision depends both on resources available in the future to state environmental agencies, and on the willingness of those agencies to tackle problems at sites they believed were successfully addressed in the past. The problem of resources to devote to enforcement is especially problematic in tight budgetary climates, as cutbacks in state budgets can lead to a slower 170. WERNSTEDT ET AL., THE BROWNFIELDS PHENOMENON, supra note 26, at 2, 12 (noting that "more opportunities for reopeners will arise as site histories lengthen at voluntarily remediated sites"); Pendergrass, supra note 63, at 1308-09 (discussing the need to audit sites with institutional controls).
171. pace of cleanups and less vigilant oversight of brownfields sites. 177 State environmental agencies have been paring back the resources they devote to enforcement generally, and New Jersey is no exception.
178 With limited resources, few state environmental agencies will prioritize oversight and monitoring of completed brownfields sites ahead of ongoing enforcement actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Finality" is elusive in brownfields redevelopment. Decades after their inception, brownfields redevelopment programs are mature environmental programs with many successes. However, closing the book on brownfields means much more than simply assessing whether remediation at some individual brownfields sites has been successful. Given the original preoccupation with shining a light on these neglected sites and getting them back into the stream of commerce, finality would mean that all of them have been inventoried, investigated, and remediated if needed. Moreover, the focus on initial cleanups comes at the expense of monitoring sites and assessing long-term results, all of which need increased attention. If states discover contamination more significant than originally present, they must address it. In addition, major societal developments in the two decades since "brownfields" first entered the nation's vocabulary, particularly the growth of the environmental justice movement and the increased focus on addressing climate change, have shown the limitations of VCPs' parcel-byparcel, developer-centered approach.
The specter of federal liability may be less significant than it once was, and VCPs have been responsible for many successes, but the final verdict on brownfields programs has yet to be rendered. 177 . See EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at l; Eisen, Brownfields Policies/or Sustainable Cities, supra note 17, at 216.
178. Rath, supra note 2, at 342-43 (describing the funding cutbacks and deregulatory legislation that have decreased the state's role in waste remediation).
